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FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3409 
_____________ 
 
NOLVIA LICETH MONTOYA-AGUILAR,  
                                   Petitioner  
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 ATTORNEY GENERAL 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A087-770-974) 
Immigration Judge: Michael W. Straus 
 
______________ 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: November 6, 2018) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
 
 
                                              
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Nolvia Liceth Montoya-Aguilar petitions for review of the BIA’s denial of her 
untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings.  
 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.1  Our 
review is limited to the BIA’s final decision and its reasoning, except to the extent that 
the BIA expressly adopted a portion of the Immigration Judge’s reasoning.2  
A motion to reopen usually must be filed within 90 days of the date a final order 
of removal is entered.3  However, a petitioner can overcome the 90-day time limit by 
presenting evidence of a material change in country conditions that was unavailable and 
undiscoverable during the initial proceeding.4  Evidence of general policies, which do not 
show a specific likelihood of persecution, are insufficient to satisfy the statutory 
requirements of the changed conditions exception.5  Here, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s 
determination that the evidence Montoya-Aguilar submitted to support her motion to 
reopen demonstrated nothing more than persistent and generalized conditions of violence 
                                              
1 Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 
F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011). 
2 Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011). 
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). 
4 Id. at § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
5 See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247, 258 (BIA 2007), aff’d, Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 
138 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Yi Guo Huang v. Att’y Gen., 343 F. App’x 811, 814 (3d Cir. 
2009) (denying motion to reopen and affirming BIA decision that appellant had not met 
changed conditions exception by presenting three undated articles describing forced 
government sterilizations). 
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against women in Honduras that had not materially changed.6  Although the conditions in 
Honduras certainly appear to be deplorable, we agree that the record does not meet the 
legal requirement of demonstrating changed country conditions that would have allowed 
her to file a motion to reopen after the 90-day time limit expired.  
 We therefore conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion and we must deny 
the petition for review.7   
                                              
6 The BIA explained “[t]he respondent has not shown worsening country conditions or 
circumstances for women in Honduras. Rather, the evidence indicates that violence 
against women in Honduras has been, and is widespread.”  J.A. at 33, Oct. 10, 2017. 
7 Although we deny Montoya-Aguilar’s petition based on her failure to establish changed 
country conditions, we note that the BIA’s denial of her motion is also supported by the 
IJ’s negative credibility determination and her failure to establish membership in the 
statutorily required “particular social group” that is a condition of qualifying as a 
“refugee” for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal. Montoya-Aguilar had to 
establish a prima facie case of eligibility for relief before the BIA considered reopening 
her appeal.  INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).  
 
